Liberal theory (like that of Rawls, which establishes basic rights and values individual freedoms unless they can be proven to show harm to others) tries to avoid moral disagreements by claiming that they are beyond the scope of policy making. As some would say, “You can’t (or shouldn’t) legislate morality.” Liberal theory tends to see moral disagreement as private. But, often we do grapple with moral issues publically because they are unavoidable or because we come to realize that something is a moral issue that we thought was uncontroversial and non-debatable before. Liberals hope that we can appeal to higher order principles (like procedural principles, rights, impartiality, and governmental non-interference) to legitimately get moral issues out of the public sphere. So, the liberal view doesn’t give us tools to deal with inevitable moral disagreement in the public sphere. That’s where G & amp;T’s argument for DD’s role in developing principles that can help us deal with moral disagreement rather than avoid it comes into play. The two sets of liberal principles that seek to avoid moral disagreement in the public sphere are: 1) Principles of Preclusion: set what gets put on the agenda for political discussion and what’s subject to legislation. These principles try to invalidate certain kinds of reasons and get moral issues off of the agenda. However, G & amp;T are going to revise these so that they can include more reasons and issues, and actually allow for more disagreement than the liberal view does. 2) Principles of Accommodation: these principles govern our conduct once we’re embroiled within a moral conflict. Liberal theorists tend not to talk about these at all, since they assume that we won’t need to use them since moral issues should be off the agenda. Procedural rules and impersonal principles should be enough. Reading Question: G & amp;T mention toleration as an impersonal principle that liberals are fond of invoking. What is toleration, and what’s wrong with it? What do G & amp;T propose instead? (p. 65). A Public Philosophy G & amp;T claim that if we exalt the value of mutual respect as a political philosophy, then we can secure broader consensus even on the most contentious of political issues. This would expand the principles that we might assert that all citizens should hold in common. These principles taken together are what G & amp;T would say constitute a public philosophy. These principles would guide us on how to act when debating issues of deep moral disagreement. G & amp;T think that their view can negotiate between a comprehensive (and maybe oppressive, remember Habermas’ critique of republicanism?) view of the good and a just skeletal notion of procedural justice (see Habermas’ critique of liberalism). G & amp;T agree that you can’t (and shouldn’t) enforce one view of the comprehensive good, but certain moral values can be shared as a part of conducting a deliberation that allows for continued disagreement. So, it’s a more substantive notion of the good than Rawls’ view of justice, but still doesn’t demand one notion of the common good for all. Morality and religion can’t be imposed on people (Locke would say not only that they shouldn’t be, but literally can’t be), but collective moral choices need to be made deliberatively. Otherwise, we are simply imposing our notions of morality on each other. Ideally, we use deliberation to check and potentially change our moral intuitions. This requires those values of open mindedness, mutual respect, and moral learning as part of the process. G & amp;T thinks that their view is less demanding than Rawls because it allows for more disagreement than the overlapping consensus. But, their views aims for more than Rawls’ view because citizens are mandated to strive for a maximum amount of agreement. We are obligated to: 1) Check our moral views and arguments against those of others to see if they hold as reasonable to others and in the public sphere, and 2) Practice mutual respect by listening to and taking the views of others seriously (p. 93). G & amp;T think that their view is favorable because it: 1) Generates the most complete political philosophy 2) Mitigates the risk of disagreement 3) Seeks resolution to persistent moral disagreements and the book of why & quot;why deliberative democracy? by amy gutmann and dennis thompson